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 In the final years of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi’s reign in Iran, longstanding social 
inequities came to a head, prompting a public outcry to restore the traditional and righteous 
prestige and repudiate Western influence in the country. A conflation of social, economic, and 
religious issues led to a civil rights movement that would quickly become a platform for the 1979 
Islamic Revolution. The deposition of the Western-backed Shah left a political vacuum in Iran 
that would ultimately be filled with an Islamic supreme leader. A modernization of Shi’a Islam, 
primarily executed with religious propaganda and recordings, was an integral step in forming the 
political sphere of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). Reframing the tenets of Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini’s specific brand of Islam would result in the inception of Iran’s infamous morality 
police, or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Basij Organization of the Oppressed (IRGC 
BOO), a stringent dress code, and a morality-based legal policy. The IRGC BOO became both a 
formidable military force and the primary enforcers of redefined Islam in modern Iran. 
Reimagining the role of mullahs strengthened the connection between politics, the people, and 
religion. The application of Islamic justice in Iran has yielded domestic resistance movements 
and drastically affected foreign affairs. Examination of the manner in which Islam was 
transformed to support the modern polity of the IRI informs our understanding of the dynamic 
social and political conditions in contemporary Iran. 
 Religious authority in the Shiite world has long belonged to presiding ayatollahs in a 
given region. However, prior to modern publication, a lack of centralization greatly limited the 
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political power of these religious leaders, even in regimes with strong Islamic foundations.1 The 
technological developments of the 19th century made the issuance of fatawa, legal advisories 
offered by religious authorities, accessible and enforceable, thus consolidating religious issues 
and authority. By the 1920s, religious leaders had, through the publication of their general 
announcements and fatawa, become significant influencers in the political sphere, with some 
notables openly supporting or criticizing the Reza Shah Pahlavi in his early reign.2 Though the 
recently fallen Qajar dynasty had been a nominally Islamic regime, technological advances better 
allowed for religious leaders to strengthen politically in Reza Shah’s rapidly secularizing Iran.  
 However, Reza Shah soon proved to be an oppressive tyrant. Well aware of the bolstered 
sway of religious leaders, and no longer needing their support, he established a secularist policy 
to legally inhibit support for the religious leaders and teachers in the country, while exiling those 
who protested his measures.3 Reza Shah’s methods of modernization often alienated the 
traditionalists, calling for unilateral adoption of the Western style of dress and an enforceable 
unveiling of Muslim women. Though clergy did not formally address these mandates in a major 
fatwa, resentment for secularization policies grew while the conservative perspective was 
increasingly isolated.4 Likewise, the remaining ashraf of the Qajar regime had been relegated to 
the periphery of the Pahlavi Order. Reza Shah had replaced the old generation of administrative 
elites with a loyal band of technocrats and military leaders, thus crafting a visage of authoritarian 
control over Iran.5  
                                                        
1 Mohammad Samiei, “Najaf and Iranian Politics: Analysing the Way the Hawzah of Najaf 
Influenced Iranian Politics between Two Revolutions,” in Journal of Shi’a Islamic Studies, Vol. 
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 All domestic opposition aside, however, Reza Shah remained in power well into the 
Second World War, at which point his globally perceived Nationalist sentiment became an 
international concern. Though Iran was officially a neutral party, the Anglo-Soviet alliance 
feared Reza Shah’s collusion with Germany due to their shared claim of Aryan-based 
nationhood.6 In late August 1941, the allied army invaded Iran, and by September 3, forcibly 
abdicated Reza Shah, leaving his 22-year-old son, Mohammad Reza in power as the head of 
state.7 However, Mohammad Reza Shah’s reign was immediately met with many of the same 
concerns presented in his father’s regime. The occupation of Iran had left the country in 
economic ruin, and the turmoil had empowered new parties, and emboldened the old. Amidst the 
tangible threats of tribal uprisings, the inception and rise of the communist Tudeh Party, 
Mohammad Reza also feared reprisal from the ashraf and clergy targeted by his father.8 
 Islamic sentiment increased in Iran over the next decade, following Mohammad 
Mossadegh’s election to Majles and subsequent appointment to Prime Minister. Mossadegh’s 
platform focused on the continuation of secularized modernization in Iran, but with a strong 
emphasis on limiting, if not fully eliminating Western influence and dependence.9 He was well 
regarded as an elected official for challenging the West with his oil nationalization plan, intended 
to remove British interference and establish a sustainable domestic market. The West responded 
with a CIA and MI6 led coup d’état in 1953 that reinforced Mohammad Reza’s position as head 
of state.10 The Shah and clergy alike supported this maneuver, as Mossadegh’s authority had 
                                                        
6 Ibid, 495 
7 Ibid, 498 
8 Ibid, 508 
9 Warren S. Goldstein, “Secularization and the Iranian Revolution,” in Islamic Perspective, No. 3 
(Islamic Perspective Center for Sociological Studies, 2010), 54 
10 Ibid, 55 
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grown to undermine their own. However, it greatly contributed to growing unrest among the 
people. 
 Determined to discourage further challenges to his rule, Mohammad Reza cracked down 
on the public through a series of reforms and initiatives enforced by his secret police force, the 
Organization of Intelligence and National Security, or SAVAK. The SAVAK’s primary mission 
was to suppress opposition to the shah via arrests, silencing the press, and closely monitoring 
Majles elections.11 As the regime became more oppressive, the public gravitated toward Islam 
and clerical protection. Opposition to the shah was better able to organize through the financially 
independent mosque network, and embraced Islam as a pragmatic avenue for revolution.12 While 
religious rhetoric did not necessarily support the popular resistance narrative, Shiite discourse 
came to represent revolutionary discourse, and afforded religious leaders new platforms. As a 
result, the leftist school of thought was ingrained in religious institutions, and Shiite religious 
tradition was integrated into the political sphere by 1960.13 
 In 1963, Mohammad Reza introduced his infamous economic reform initiative, the White 
Revolution. Intended to modernize and industrialize Iran, the White Revolution was centered on 
large-scale land reform. This program called for the redistribution of Shiite leaders’ 
landholdings, which threatened their influence and wealth, and displaced the peasantry in the 
affected region.14 Unsurprisingly, this policy bolstered religious opposition to the shah. Peasantry 
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joined the discontented middle class and national front in their subversive endeavors with the 
clergy.15 The subsequent stages of the White Revolution focused on the social class, and better 
incorporating Western imports in this sector. This increased emphasis on Western goods 
strengthened foreign influence in Iran’s economy and damaged the bazaar system that financed 
religious institutions through religious taxes.16 While these strategies were not inherently anti-
Islamic, they greatly diminished the central power of the faith, further alienating clergy and 
followers. 
 As civil and religious autonomy deteriorated, the Shi’i liberation school of thought 
concentrated on egalitarianism and condemnation of quietists arguing for clerical withdrawal 
from politics. A number of leftist Islamist intellectuals spoke out against Mohammad Reza’s 
tyranny and marginalization of the lower classes, and the SAVAK began a series of attacks on 
religious centers, where they assaulted and arrested clergy.17 In response, several politically 
minded religious leaders joined popular movements and violent protests. Among the most 
notable participants was Ruhollah Khomeini, who was arrested and exiled in June 1963.18 While 
Iran became increasingly dangerous for Islamist thinkers, the religious center of Najaf became a 
hub for religious intellectualism and politics. Religious leaders in Najaf, being outside the 
Pahlavi regime’s control, were able to use the Shi’a network to better take political action, 
coordinate, and distribute information on behalf of the revolutionaries in Iran.19 
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 While in exile, Ruhollah Khomeini primarily lived in Najaf, honing his political and 
religious thought through writings and lectures that earned him repute among his peers and the 
disaffected Iranian citizens. During this period, he began work on his Velayat-e Faqih, a 
blueprint for an Islamic government, first published in 1970. His writings and seminars 
culminated on garnering popular consent and controlling public will on the pretense that Islamic 
guardianship was a necessity for civil, equitable governance.20 His work during this period 
highlights the connection between civil and religious concerns in Iran. In his lectures, he 
repeatedly suggested that representatives of secular republics and monarchies abuse their 
constituents by enacting laws to their direct detriment.21 His argument that a polity bound in 
Islamic law would better serve the people than the shah’s regime resonated in Iran in the wake of 
the White Revolution and SAVAK attacks. 
 Throughout the 1970s, Khomeini’s support base grew in the interconnected Islamic and 
Arab worlds. The mounting insurrection in Iran attracted international speculation on the 
stability of Mohammad Reza Shah’s regime and role of prominent opposing figures. Intelligence 
agencies began focusing on these issues in order to assess the severity of the Iran situation. In a 
November 1978 Central Intelligence report, the National Foreign Assessment Center examined 
Khomeini’s use of Islam and rhetoric and attempted to determine what implications the rise of a 
Shi’a government would carry. The report identifies major themes in Khomeini’s 1963-1978 
speeches and pamphlets as opposition to Mohammad Reza’s economic and social policies, anti-
Zionism, and denunciation of Western influence.22 These themes underpin the unspoken basis of 
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Khomeini’s conceptualization of Islamic pluralism: a fluid socioeconomic system able to support 
autocratic rule. 
 The document also addresses Khomeini’s support base and his public appeal. Opposition 
to the Pahlavi Order was broad in affiliation and intent. The CIA recognized that Khomeini’s 
envisioned Islamic government was deliberately left open to interpretation by the diverse field of 
dissidents comprised of clergy, peasantry, urbanites, and students in order to unify the otherwise 
unorganized groups.23 Though religious institutions had long been centers for organized 
rebellion, the relationship between Shiite leaders and civil malcontents was born of necessity 
rather than shared ideological objectives, making the connection tenuous. A December 1978 CIA 
memorandum labels the primary unification tactics employed by Khomeini as student protests, 
random violence, and terrorism as directed by leaflets and tape recordings distributed through the 
mosque network.24 Though not all of the opposition movement shared motives or direction, the 
Khomeini’s vague doctrine of beliefs was nonthreatening when compared to the Shah’s 
tyrannical rule, and his organizational capabilities enabled the movement to take more 
efficacious action. 
 The movement continued until realizing its aim of deposing Mohammad Reza Shah on 
16 January 1979, ending the Pahlavi Order and exiling Iran’s final monarch. Khomeini was 
immediately welcomed back to Tehran, at which point the royal regency was unseated, leaving 
no clear rule in the country. In a strategic gambit, Khomeini’s discourse quickly adopted the 
leftist egalitarian platform as a fixed component in his plan for an Islamic state, arguing that the 
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24 CIA, “Memorandum: Opposition Operations in Iran: Leadership, Organization, and Tactics,” 
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revolution had been a war between the impoverished faithful and the capitalist infidels.25 Now 
back in the political vacuum of Iran, Khomeini began to more clearly define his intentions and 
outline policies for his theocracy. The Islamic Republic was adopted in April of 1979, with 
Khomeini seated in the position of supreme leader. 
 Khomeini’s brand of Islam soon became apparent as he initiated his reforms. National 
and student publications covered Khomeini’s initiatives with varied levels of support. Kayhan, a 
conservative newspaper established in 1946 became the chief representation for the Supreme 
Leader. The front page of an early1979 issue reads in part, “In an Islamic government, there is no 
dictatorship,” while simultaneously threatening an armed response to conflict against the Islamic 
Republic.26 This was not an empty threat. On 5 May 1979, Khomeini founded the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps to consolidate his supporters, replace the regular armed forces of the 
fallen monarchy, and defend his subsequent policies. The IRGC was also awarded the heraldry 
slogan, “Prepare against them what force you can,” in reference to the Quranic verse 8:60, which 
discusses defense against the enemies of Allah.  
 In October of 1979, the New York Times published an interview with Khomeini in which 
he defends his Islamic Republic and reforms. When asked what shape his republic would take, 
Khomeini said, “To begin with, the word Islam does not need adjectives such as democratic… 
We cannot afford to have such an ambiguous concept placed in our Constitution.”27 Khomeini 
was asserting that his republic of the people under Islam was intended to support religious rule, 
and not civil freedoms. As the interview continued, he addressed the martial law and attacks and 
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arrests on citizens found guilty of morality crimes, such as adultery and homosexuality. He 
stated, “In Islam we want to implement a policy to purify society, and in order to achieve this 
aim we must punish those who bring evil to our youth.”28 His vague staging of the regime had 
allowed him a status in which he, as Supreme Leader, and other clergy, as students and teachers 
of Islam, could interpret the laws of Islam and deliver rulings with impunity. 
 At the onset of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, the IRI was still weak and the IRGC was 
inexperienced in formal combat, and did not have sufficient manpower. Khomeini relied on the 
unwavering loyalty of his nascent military, and was concerned that full-scale mobilization or 
mass conscription could risk this relationship.29 At this point, the Basij had a role most similar to 
Mohammad Reza Shah’s SAVAK, and were not adequately prepared for participation in a war. 
The Basij had 2.5 million members in 1983, but less than 20% had received military training, 
and they were instead used primarily as domestic security forces, aimed at suppressing 
opposition to the IRI and arresting citizens for morality crimes.30 As the situation with Iraq 
worsened, more emphasis was placed on training and recruiting Basij. IRGC and Basij forces 
had a more stringent screening process than regular conscripted military, and were recruited 
through mosques with written recommendations from clergy based on their ideological beliefs.31 
 By 1987, hardened by nearly a decade of war, the Basij had become an elite fighting 
force. Clerical indoctrination, improved training centers, and weapons acquisition convinced the 
United States that Basij were prepared and likely to carry on Khomeini’s ideology after his 
death.32 Beneath the Basij, other official organizations were put in place to police the public. 
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Komitehs, representative of the autonomous mosque network, and Qazi, judicial police, now had 
established patrols in the public sphere to ensure conformity and adherence to religious law.33 
This strengthened the role of mullahs, low-level clergy, who had now been given judiciary and 
political roles in their communities. 
 The Islamic Republic emerged from the war with a strong, but malleable framework and 
defensible constitution. Khomeini devised a government that served his purposes, to depose the 
shah and grant religious leader’s tangible political power. His Islamic Guard and clerical support 
helped to enforce this vision, but perhaps more importantly, they were left in power of a fluid, 
interpretative system after Khomeini’s death. However, the people, particularly religious or 
leftist minorities, were in a familiar situation marked by suppression with limited civil and 
democratic liberties. Khomeini’s use of Islam as an intellectual crafted a polity suited to 
dictatorial rule, better defended than that of the Pahlavi Order through the extensive mosque 
network, heavily Islamic Majles, and IRGC.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
33 Ibid, 17 
Reed 11 
 
 
 
Works Cited 
 
Amanat, Abbas, Iran: A Modern History, (Yale University Press, 2017) 
 
Ciasc, Rustin-Petru, “From the White Revolution to the Islamic Revolution – The Social,  
Economic, Legal, and Religious Context that Led to the Fall of Monarchy in Iran,” in  
Cogito: Multidisciplinary Research Journal, Vol. 5, No. 2 ((Dimitre Cantemir Christian 
University, 2013), pp. 58-62) 
 
CIA, “ Iran: Military Manpower Problems Limit War Options,” October 1983 
 
CIA, “Iran’s Revolutionary Guard: Armed Pillar of the Islamic Republic,” January 1987 
 
CIA, “Memorandum: Opposition Operations in Iran: Leadership, Organization, and Tactics,” 21 
December 1978 
 
CIA, “Memorandum: The Politics of Ruhollah Khomeini,” 20 November 1978 
 
Fallaci, Oriana, “An Interview with Khomeini,” in The New York Times (7 October 1979) 
 
Federal Research Division, Iran: A Country Study, ed. by Glenn E. Curtis and Eric Hooglund,  
(Library of Congress, 2008) 
 
Goldstein, Warren S., “Secularization and the Iranian Revolution,” in Islamic Perspective, No. 3  
(Islamic Perspective Center for Sociological Studies, 2010) 
 
Hossainzadeh, Nura, “Ruhollah Khomeini’s Political Thought: Elements of Guardianship,  
Consent, and Representative Government,” in Journal of Shi’a Islamic Studies, Vol. 7,  
No. 2, ((ICAS Press, 2014), pp. 129-150) 
 
Kayhan, “Imam Khomeini’s Interview with Kayhan,” in Kayhan, (Kayhan Institute 23 January  
1979) 
 
Saffari, Siavash, “Two Pro-Mostazafin Discourses in the 1979 Iranian Revolution,” in  
Contemporary Islam, Vol. 11, No. 3 ((Springer Verlag, 2017), pp. 287-301) 
 
Samiei, Mohammad, “Najaf and Iranian Politics: Analysing the Way the Hawzah of Najaf  
Influenced Iranian Politics between Two Revolutions,” in Journal of Shi’a Islamic  
Reed 12 
Studies, Vol. V, No. 3 ((ICAS Press, Summer 2012), pp. 277-294) 
 
 
 
   
